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LORD FORBES OF PITSLIGO
AND THE MAXIMS OF
LA ROCHEFOUCAULD

Irwin Primer

While the popularity of books of maxims, aphorisms and
quotations seems to be a permanent fact in our culture,
criticism of these short forms has usually remained marginal.
But that seems to be changing. Owing to the recent revival of
critical interest in genre studies, we are now witnessing an
efflorescence of critical studies of the maxim on a scale not
previously achieved.1 This holds not only for the maxim genre
as a whole, but also for specific practitioners of that an, among

1 For a sampling of important studies and collections on the maxim and other
short forms, see: J. P. Stern, Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of Scattered Occasions
Reconstructed from his Aphorisms and Reflections (Bloomington; Indiana U. Press,
1959); Margot Kruse, Die Maxime in der Franzosischen Literatur. Studien zum
Wertz La Rochefoucaulds und seiner Nachfolger (Hamburg: Cram, de Gruyter,
1960); Geoffrey Bennington, Sententiousness and the Novel: Laying Down the Law
in Eighteenth-Century French Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986); Liane Ansmann, Die "Maximen* von La Rochefoucauld (Munchen: 1972);
Gerhard Neumann, ed., Der Aphorismus: Zur Geschichte, zu den Formen and
Moglichkeiten einer literarischen Gattung (Darmstadt: 1976); Corrado Rosso, La
"Maxime" Saggi per una tipologia critica (Napoli: E. S. I., 1968); Harold E.
Pagliaro, “Paradox in the Aphorisms of La Rochefoucauld and Some Representa
tive English Followers," PMLA 79 (1964): 42-50; Louis Van Delft, Le Moraliste
Classique: Essai de definition et de typologie (Geneve: Droz, 1982); Jean Lafond,
ed., Les Formes Breves de la Prose et le Discours Discontinu (XVIe-XVIIe Siecles
(Pans: Vrin, 1984); Jefferson Humphries, The Puritan and the Cynic: Moralists
and Theorists in French and American Letters (New York; Oxford University
Press, 1987); Kevin L. Cope, “The Propositions of Faith; The Ideology of the
Royal Society and Bunyans Academy of Maxims," Publications of the Mississippi
Philological Association 88 (1989): 28-38.
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whom La Rochefoucauld still reigns supreme. No one, I think,
has challenged the preeminence of the due de La Roche
foucauld as the greatest writer of maxims in the last three or
four centuries. He wrote in an age when maxim-writing was
one of the most popular literary pursuits, and his small book
of maxims, more popular than any other in his time, went
through numerous editions and soon became a modern "clas
sic.” Before the end of the seventeenth century his maxims had
already appeared in at least three different English translations.
He was also cited and imitated a good deal, but very few
English responses to his maxims appeared before the eighteenth
century.
What is usually examined first in tracing an author’s
reputation is the impact he or she had on later authors, espe
cially those of the first rank. The most famous writer in
eighteenth-century English literature to affirm his approval of
La Rochefoucauld was Jonathan Swift, If we can take Swift at
his word, in his famous letter to Pope of Nov. 26, 1725, he
"found [his] whole character” in La Rochefoucauld. Fourteen
years later, in his satiric autobiographical poem "Verses on the
Death of Dr. Swift” (1739), he seems to have corroborated his
earlier pronouncement by founding his poem upon one of the
most spectacular of the duke’s maxims:

In the adversity of our best friends we always find
something that does not displease us. [#583; MS 18]

Although his role in making this particularly mordant maxim
widely Known to English readers is a commonplace of eight
eenth-century literary history, most of his readers have not
known that #583 had not previously appeared in an English
translation. Swift thereby contributed noth to the Englishing
of La Rochefoucauld and to the advancement of his reputation
among readers of English.
Equally important in bringing La Rochefoucauld to the
attention of English readers in that period was Bernard
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, which quotes three of the duke's
maxims and alludes to many more. Joseph Addison generally
despised the maxims (ana moral philosophy) of self-love.
Alexander Pope responded to Swift’s letter by declaring his
intention to compose maxims in opposition to those of La
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Rochefoucauld.2
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu was so
annoyed by the duke’s single maxim on marriage that she
wrote a full essay—in French—attacking the duke’s dismissive
remark and claiming more for marriage than he was willing to
allow.3 Samuel Richardson’s book of maxims (extracted from
his three novels) was assembled in pan as a deliberate attempt
to emulate the duke’s maxims while substituting approved
Christian morality in place of their allegedly dangerous
doctrines.4 In Lord Chesterfield’s posthumous Letters to His
Son (1774) readers discovered that Chesterfield had recom
mended the duke’s maxims to his son, thus challenging the
common denunciations of the duke's ethic of self-love.5
Though it was not possible to regard each of his maxims as
a subversion of conventional Christian morality, they came to
be regarded by many as an assault on the dignity or man and
on the possibility of disinterested benevolent conduct. But that
seems not to have interfered with their popularity. They were
frequently quoted, paraphrased, imitated, praised and repudi
ated. In virtually every anthology of aphorisms or maxims in
that period we find at least a few of them, and sometimes a
few hundred. Most of the major eighteenth-century authors
used them or at least took notice of them, but if we look for
a detailed discussion in English on all or most of them, we
remain disappointed. It is one thing to note the spread of his
maxims but quite another to find early discussions or criticisms
of them. The remainder of this paper is devoted to an obscure
work by an obscure author who took greater pains to compre
hend La Rochefoucauld’s meanings than any other eighteenth-

2 For Pope and Swift on La Rochefoucauld, see The Correspondence ofJonathan
Swift, ed Harold Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), III, 108,
117-18. 121. 510. See also Joseph Spence. Observations, Anecdotes, and Characters
of Books and Men, rd. James M Osborn, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966),
219-20 (#517)
For a useful compilation
many eighteenth century British
authors and works that cite or allude to the Maximes, see Antony McKenna,
"Quelques aspects de la reception des Maximes en Angleterre," Images de La
Rochefoucauld: Artes du Tricentenaire, 1680-1980, ed. Jean Lafond and Jean
Mesnard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1983): 77-94.
3 Lady Mary Pierrepont Wortley Montagu, Essays and Poems and Simplicity, A
Comedy, ed. Robert Halsband and Isobel Grundy (Oxford: Oxford University
Preis. 1977): 157-64
4 Samuel Richardson, A Collection of the Moral and Instructive Sentiments (London:
1755). See note 22, below.
5 Letters Written by the Late Right Honourable Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of
Chesterfield, to His Son. 2 vols. (London: 1774). See the letters dated March 9.
1748 O. S. and September 5, 1748 O. S , among others.
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century anglophone writer. My original intention was to keep
La Rochefoucauld at the center of this stage, but his comment
ator turned out to he an attractive figure, of considerable
interest even apart from any connection with the duke’s
maxims. Thus what began as an effort to disclose new facts
about La Rochefoucauld's English reputation gradually came to
include a survey of the career and literary output of this
neglected and almost unread commentator.
O

O

O

O

O

O

O

The author in question, the Scottish Jacobite Alexander Forbes,
Lord Forbes ofPitsligo (1678-1762), was born two years before
the death of Francois, due de La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680).
He has remained virtually unknown to all except those who
are well-informed about the course of Jacobitism and the
history of Scotland in the eighteenth century. Forbes's locale
is Aberdeenshire in the northeast of Scotland, and his name is
associated with the group known as the Scottish mystics of the
north-east.6 In history his surviving image is that of a Jacobite
activist who participated in the '15 and the ‘45. Years before
engaging in these military ventures, Forbes ("an adherent of the
protestant episcopal church of Scotland,” according to the
DNB] had traveled on the Continent and had personally met
Archbishop Fenelon, who introduced him to the Quietist
Madame Guyon and to others attracted to mystical religion.
He is reported to have spent seven days in her vicinity, up to
the day of her death, in 1710.7 He did not convert to Catholi
cism (as did Andrew Michael Ramsay and John Hughes), but
his encounters with Fenelon and Mme. Guyon nevertheless
influenced him deeply.
Always loyal to the Stuart line, he refused to accept the Act
of Settlement (1701) and left the Scottish Parliament in 1705,
unwilling to abjure his allegiance to the House of Stuart.
Following the failure of the Jacobite uprising of 1715, he spent
about four years (1716-20) on the Continent, sometimes at the

6
See G D Henderson
, Mysteries of the Northteast (Aberdeen: University of
Aberdeen Press, 1934).
7 See Albert Cherel, Fenelon au XVIII urrfr (Paris: 1917). 45n Forbes, we are
further informed, was one of the seven or so Protestants who stayed with Mme.
Guyon at Blois, praying in her household and absorbing the Quietist doctrines
and manner of living (48-9).
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court of the Jacobite exiles. In the 1730’s he completed two
books, the second of which (the subject of this paper) was pub
lished first.8 In the '45, in his sixty-seventh year, ne command
ed a troop of "130 horse and 250 foot” from Banffshire and
Aberdeen,” and after the rebels were defeated he did not
emigrate with other defeated Jacobites but remained a fugitive
in hiding in his own neighborhood and lands until his death in
1762.9 He was much hunted but never apprehended, and the
most appealing episodes in his somewhat romantic biography
are the tales of his narrow escapes while eluding his pursuers.
In a recent article Murray G. H. Pittock writes that in Sir
Walter Scott's Waverley, the character Bradwardine (a man of
learning, of the Lowland gentry, who also hides on his own
estate) was modeled upon the career and character of Lord
Forbes of Pitsligo.10
In this paper I am concerned specifically with his first
published nook, Essays Moral and Philosophical, on several
subjects: viz. A View of the Human Faculties. A short Account
of the World. Two Discourses on Decency. An Essay on Self-

8 It should be noted that Forbes’s Essays of 1734 was his first published book. His
other book, Thoughts concerning Man's Condition was written in 1732 but first
published in 1763 and reprinted in 1835 with a memoir by his kinsman Lord
Medwin. It is more pietistic and (I think) less interesting than his Essays. Other
writings by Lord Forbes indude a narrative that takes up most of Henrietta
Tayler, ed., The Jacobite Court of Rome in 1719 (Publications of the Scottish
Historical Society, 3rd Series, vol. xxxi; [Edinburgh: 1938]. and Alistair and
Henrietta Tayler, eds., Jacobite Letters to Lord Pitsligo, 1745-46, preserved at Fetter
cairn House (Aberdeen: Milne and Hutchison, 1930).
9 Fitzroy Maclean, Bonnie Prince Charlie (New York: Athenaeum, 1989): 99. See
also A. McKenzie Annand, “Lord Pitsligo's horse in the army of Prince Charles
Edward, 1745-6" Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 60 (1982); I
wish to thank Deborah Leslie for this reference. The biographical articles on
Lord Forbes always repeat a number of romantic anecdotes about bis disguises,
ruses and close calls in eluding his English pursuers.
10 The most important indication of renewed interest in Lord Forbes is Murray
G.H. Pittock’s article "Jacobitism in the North East: The Pitsligo Papers in the
Aberdeen University Library," Aberdeen and the Enlightenment, ed. Jennifer J.
Caner and Joan H. Pittock (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987): 69-76;
see 70-71 Because Pittock is concerned primarily with certain aspects of Forbes’s
political position that can be known only from surviving manuscripts in the
Aberdeen University Library, he sees no need to bring Forbes's Essays Moral and
Philosophical into his discussion. However, a comprehensive account of Forbes’s
political ideas and opinions would also have to include passages from his Essay
that touch upon liberty, equality, power, dominion, private property, money, the
necessity and functions of government, and the views of the French political
theorist Domat on the distinction of ranks.
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Love. (London: Printed for J. Osborn and T. Longman, at the
Ship, in Paternoster-Row. M. DCC. XXXIV). None of the
better-known philosophers and literati of the mid-eighteenth
century, it would seem, bothered to take any notice of this
work, possibly because it did not appeal sufficiently to the
trendsetting intellectuals—or perhaps because Forbes withheld
his name from the title page of the first and only edition in his
lifetime. Published three years before Hume’s “stillborn”
Treatise (1737), it too seems to have appeared and disappeared
quietly, having produced no controversy. Thus far no con
temporary replies, rebuttals or reviews of this book have been
found. After he died it was reprinted in 1763, but even with
his authorship identified on the title page, it again stirred no
intellectual waves. James Boswell at this time was newly ac
quainted with Johnson, and they probably did discuss Lord
Forbes on occasion, but never once does the name Alexander
Forbes appear in Boswell’s Journals or in his massive Life of
Johnson.11
Forbes’s book lay buried for more than a century and did
not reappear until 1970 in a facsimile reprint of the first
edition. His philosophical achievement is admittedly far less
distinguished than that of Descartes, Hobbes, Malebranche,
Bayle, Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz or Hume. In our histories of
philosophy he does not even rank with writers like Clarke,
Toland, Shaftesbury, Butler, Hartley, Kames, Smith, Reid or
Priestley. Standard reference works on English philosophy and
theology for this period have generally ignored him, perhaps
because Forbes had never been regarded as belonging within
the mainstream of philosophical writing. T. E. Jessop, whose
well-known bibliography of David Hume (1938) includes a list
of 38 other Scottish philosophers of the eighteenth century,
excluded Forbes entirely. (In a list of 38 Scottish philosophers

11 This omission could have resulted from a deliberate attempt to avoid naming
Lord Forbes in print; on the other hand, there seems to be no record of Lord
Forbes in Boswell’s journals. While Boswell was working on his Life of Johnson,
one of his correspondents was his dear friend (and eventually the executor of his
estate), the baronet Sir William Forbes (1743-1806). This Sir William was
distantly related to the attainted Lord Forbes of Pitsligo, much of whose estate he
had earlier acquired. The only mention of Lord Forbes in the Yale Boswell
Papers occurs in a letter by Sir William Forbes (to Boswell, 29 October 1791) in
which he repons that he has been perusing a manuscript account of the Jacobite
court at Rome in 1719, written by Lord Forbes. That manuscript was later
published in a previously-mentioned volume edited by Henrietta Tayler, The
acobite Court at Rome in 1719 (see n9 above).
J
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of the eighteenth century, was there no room for an attainted
Jacobite who had written a not uninteresting work on some of
the most important philosophical issues of his time?) Apart
from the fine article by Murray G. H. Pittock, most recent
studies of eighteenth-century Scottish culture have continued to
ignore his writings.12
O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Forbes's Essays Moral and Philosophical is best classified as a
miscellany because it is not entirely a collection of essays in the
genre of Montaigne and Bacon. Of the three distinct units of
this work, the first, which takes up half of this book, com
prises a series of brief philosophical dialogues between Lucinus
and AEmilius, two gentlemen who agree so often that both can
be thought to express Forbes's views. This genre, descending
from Plato and Cicero, was popular in the Renaissance ana
seventeenth century, and continued to be used in the eight
eenth century by such contemporaries of Forbes as Lord
Shaftesbury, Berkeley, Mandeville and Hume. Part I of these
“Dialogues on several Subjects betwixt two Intimate Friends"
is named “A View of the Human Faculties," and the subjects
they discuss in about one hundred pages are “men in general,"
the body, the soul, sensation, imagination, the passions,
complexion/disposition/humour, liberty, reason, the memory
and speech, in that order. In the next hundred pages—Part II,
“A Short Account of the World"—the two speakers first review
different senses of the term “world" (i. e., “the whole Creation,
visible and invisible," the Universe, the Natural World, the
Moral World, and the Polite World). Thereafter they discuss
a series of related subjects: the two cities of St. Augustine, the
mixed state of things, remains of virtue, helps to religion, the

On the exclusion of Forbes from the mainstream of Scottish philosophy, I have
12
noted his absence in T. E. Jessop, A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish
Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour (London: 1938). Henry G.
Graham ignored him completely in his Scottish Men of Letters in the Eighteenth
Century (London: A. & C. Black, 1901). Jane Rendall, who attempts to give a
broad survey of earlier eighteenth-century Scottish writing and culture, also
ignores Lord Forbes; see her book, The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment
(N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press. 1978). Nor is Forbes mentioned by Claude Nqrdmann
in “Les Jacobites Ecossais en France au XVlIIe siede," Regards sur l'Ecosse au
XVIIIe siecle, ed. Michele S. Plaisant (Lille: Publications de l'Universite de Lille
ID. n.d.): 81-108.
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equality of men by nature, accidental characters, conversation
and books. The dialogue form permits swift movement from
subject to subject, and the entire performance reminds one of
a series of short essays and reflections.
Much of Forbes’s subject matter here is of the sort often
seen in the treatises of the passions that flourished in that era.
These dialogues reveal occasional quotations from La Rochefou
cauld, but the presence of the duke’s thought is much more
fundamental—or foundational—in the next two major units. In
the second unit, “Two Discourses on Decency," Forbes devotes
about 35 pages to a close examination of the meanings and
implications of decency, all proceeding from the single short
maxim that La Rochefoucauld penned on that subject. The last
major unit in Forbes’s book, “An Essay on Self-Love," is yet
more thoroughly suffused with the words and spirit of La
Rochefoucauld. (We shall return to these latter units for closer
examination.)
Forbes’s book as a whole surveys most of the popular moral
and religious issues of his time, interspersed with miscellaneous
observations on and quotations from ancient and modern
authors. It contains almost no “natural philosophy” or science,
but generous space is given to Cicero, Horace, St. Augustine,
Hobbes, Milton, Henry More, Lord Rochester, Shaftesbury,
and especially to Pascal and the due de La Rochefoucauld.
Unlike his younger contemporary Francis Hutcheson, Forbes
does not anticipate the major directions of the emergent
Scottish Enlightenment, except where he grapples with issues
of permanent importance such as the nature of reason and the
selfish passions. His deepest commitment was to the Christian
ethic and to arguments in favor of the "pure, disinterested love
of God,” a phrase that signaled his sympathy for Quietism.13

13 The literature on Fenelon. Guyon and Quietism is extensive. A good introduc
tion is Jean Robert Armogathe, Le Qtaetisme (Paris: PUF, 1973). See also
Francoise Mallet-Joris. Jeanne Guyon (Paris: Flammarton. 1978) and Henri G.
Gouhier, Fenelon philosophe (Pam: Vrin. 1977). Writings by and about Fenelon
and Guyon appeared in eighteenth-century English translations; for example. A
Dissertation on Pure Love, By the Arch Bishop of Cambray, With An Account of the
Life and Writings of the Lady [Mine. Guyon], for whose Sake the Archbishop was
banish d from Court: And the grievous Persecution she suffer'd in France for her
Religion, [etc.] (Dublin. 1739). In an article written for the Fenelon tercentenary
in the early 1950s. Jean Orcibal briefly notes that Forbes encouraged the
publication of translated writings by Fenelon. Madame Guyon and other French
writers on religion. See Orcibal. “L'influence spirituelle de Fenelon dans les pays
anglo-saxons,' XVlle Siecle, ##12-14 (1951-2); 276-87.
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At the heart of his hook is his defense and explication of
Christian values, but (as we are specifically informed) he
wanted to avoid writing anything resembling a systematic
treatise on theology:
I took all the care I could, that it might have no Air of
a Religious Dissertation. It was indeednext to impossible
to avoid saying somewhat on the Love of God, that the
contrary Doctrine might appear the more in its own
Colours, (v)
With respect to the manner, Forbes seems to be emulating the
aristocratic attitude toward publication that readers of La
Rochefoucauld’s first edition encountered in 1665: a conscious
effort to avoid pedantry and systematic composition. “Polite"
authors do not engage in such demeaning tasks! As for the
substance of his remark, just what is that contrary Doctrine"
he introduces? Probably atheism, or deism, or both. We are
not told directly, but the next excerpt from his letter to the
publisher concerns the reflection or essay on self-love (amourpropre) that La Rochefoucauld placed at the head of the first
authorized edition of his maxims in 1665. The implication
seems to be that La Rochefoucauld is representative of those
who maintain the “contrary Doctrine" ana are thereby opposed
to “the Love of God.” Forbes never makes so blunt an accusa
tion, but the general drift of his polemic is that those thinkers
and writers who argue that all human behavior is selfishly
motivated or rooted inescapably in self-love are fundamentally
antagonistic to Christianity, or at least are dangerous to that
religion.
In these “essays moral and philosophical" Forbes avoids any
sectarian partiality; he never identifies the church he supports.
He quotes with approval not only from the Anglican clergy
man and Cambridge Platonist, Dr. Henry More, but also from
such Catholic authors as Fenelon, Pascal and St. Augustine. La
Rochefoucauld, the author he cites most, was also a Catholic
but his celebrated maxims are never exhibited as models of
Catholic thought or piety, for they are most often concerned
with worldly conduct or mondanite. What makes Forbes's
treatment of La Rochefoucauld unusual in his moment is the
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respect and admiration he seems to show for this noble author,
even while criticizing his "doctrine.” Most of the English
clergy and moralists who dealt with Hobbes, La Rochefoucauld
and Mandeville had harsh words for them. Forbes mentions
and quotes from Hobbes in a few passages, but he never
mentions Mandeville’s name. Nor does ne name or quote
from any of the well-known deists of his age such as Collins,
Toland, Tindal or Woolston. The authors upon whom he
relies most are La Rochefoucauld, Pascal, St. Paul and St.
Augustine. It can also be said that the images of Archbishop
Fenelon and Madame Guyon are summoned up frequently,
that is, whenever Forbes uses the phrases “the pure love of
God" or “the pure disinterested love of God.” Yet he men
tions Fenelon’s name only twice in this book, and the name
Guyon is entirely absent.
He defends Christianity throughout but at the same time he
completely avoids sectarian rhetoric:
we never see him
attacking or defending a specifically Protestant or an exclusively
Catholic doctrine. His range of discourse is specified in his
title, but not completely, because it soon becomes clear that his
moral and philosophical ideas are entirely grounded in his
Christian faith. Much of his effort is expended upon clarifying
the meaning and importance of certain key terms:
not
eucharist or trinity or saving grace (terms from current
Christian controversy), but "philosophical" terms such as
decency and self-love, which take up the larger part of his
book. When we find that he takes his texts for these terms
from La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes and that he is mainly
concerned to explicate these terms in their relationships to
Christian beliefs, we come to realize how different and atypical
this approach is.
Though Forbes appears loyal to the spirit of Fenelon and
Madame Guyon, he never reveals himself as a mystic—unless
adherence to the doctrine of "the pure love of God” immedi
ately identifies one as such. Whatever propensities he may
have had for the mystical, in this book he remains at the
threshold of mystical divinity, never evincing more of it than
the associations accompanying his code-phrase, “the pure
disinterested love of God." That is as close to the language of
inspiration as he takes us. Avoiding the visionary (which he
generally regarded as "enthusiasm" in its negative sense), he is
intent upon differentiating the multiple meanings that inhere
in amour-propre and determining their relative goodness or evil
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in relation to his axiomatic pure love of God. For his authori
ties on Christianity he cites St. Paul and St. Augustine, and
(among the moderns) especially Pascal. John Barker has
convincingly demonstrated an extensive "concurrence” or
agreement between Forbes’s outlook and "the themes and spirit
of the Pensees,” and concluded that Forbes "particularly favored
Pascal.”14 But Barker ignored the fact that if we compare the
number of citations and the amount of space that Forbes
devotes to both Pascal and La Rochefoucauld, it turns out that
Forbes cites La Rochefoucauld more often than he cites
Pascal.15 These references suggest that Forbes was preoccupied
with La Rochefoucauld at least as much as he was with Pascal,

14 John Barker. Strange Contrarieties: Pascal in England during the Age of Reason
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 1975): 172. For Barker’s comments
on Forbes’s Essays, see 168-76. The only other scholarly reference to Forbes’s
concern with La Rochefoucauld, so far as I know, is a paragraph in Antony
McKenna’s article; see note 1. McKenna summarizes Forbes’s position on amour
propre but ignores what Forbes was trying to do with La Rochefoucauld’s maxim
on decency, which I take up later in this paper.
15 The following maxims by La Rochefoucauld are quoted, alluded to, or adapted
to new uses by Forbes; the page number in Forbes’s
Moral and Philo
sophical is supplied in parentheses following the G. E. F. and Truchet number that
identifies the French maxim: G. E. F. and Truchet #10 (53). #13 (56). #83 (260
and 318). #85 (318), #89 (85). #102 (72). #171 (338). #218 (233-4 and 358), #266
(53). #447 (205 and 229). #454 (227), #483 (177 and 235). #563-Truchet MS 1-the
essay on amour-propre (55, 116, 249-52, and 341-5), 0564-Truchet MS 2 (53), and
0606-Truchet MS 34 (358).
The entry "G. E. F. 563” (for instance) refers to the maxim of that number
as it appears in OEuvres de La Rochefoucauld (in the series "Collection des Grands
Ecrivains de la France”), ed. by D. L. Gilbert, J. Gourdault. A. and H. Regnier,
4 vols. (Pans, 1868-83). This edition of the duke’s Reflexions ou Sentences et
Maximes morales remained the standard edition until the appearance of the "Classiques Garnier” edition entitled Maximes, ed. by Jacques Truchet (Pans, 1967 and
later revised editions). The Gilbert edition (1868) is commonly indicated by the
abbreviation for its series: G. E. F., followed by the number of the maxim. It
numbered the maxims consecutively from 1 to 641. Truchet gives the contents
of the 1678 edition (504 maxims), then adds a group called "Maximes Supprimecs”
(MS: maxims removed by La Rochefoucauld from editions following the first,
which appeared in 1665), and further adds a third group called "Maximes
Posthumes” (MP: maxims from various sources attributed to La Rochefoucauld
after his death). The Truchet numbers match the G. E. F. numbers up to 0504;
thereafter the MS and MP groups appear in Truchet’s edition. For the con
venience of the reader I shall identity the Rochefoucauld maxims using both
editions. Thus G. E. F. 556 refers to that maxim in the Gilbert (or G. E. F.)
edition; it corresponds to Truchet‘s MP 31.
References to and quotations from Pascal occur on the following pages of
Forbes’s book: 23, 132, 133. 155. 165. 252-4. 263-4, 309, 321. 350, 353. 361, 362.
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though he was much more sympathetic to Pascal’s expressions
of Christian faith.

O O O O O O O
Most of the attention that Forbes gives to La Rochefoucauld is
concentrated within the last and most ambitious of these
essays, the 140-page “Essay on Self-Love" (245-3851. For
Forces the amour-propre maxim/essay (or reflexion] is La
Rochefoucauld's central text. He not only includes substan
tial extracts (with running commentary) from this spectacular
essay on amour-propre (G. E. F. 563 or Truchet M.S. 1), but
also provides a complete English translation of it in an appen
dix entitled “Additions." He regards La Rochefoucauld's
conception of amour-propre as a new and dangerous image of
self-love that regrettably came to be much admired in his own
era. And since, as he argues, not all self-love is reprehensible,
he undertakes to point out various misunderstandings of the
duke's “doctrine," making sure to explain what amour-propre is
not, as well as what it is. In the process he often reiterates his
central argument, that any moral system founded on self-love
is fallacious because it contradicts true religion founded on the
pure disinterested love of God.
One of the more notable aspects of his rhetoric or argument
is his determination to avoid sectarian religious polemic while
still insisting on the truth of Christianity or revealed religion.
His yardstick is not any of the commonplace standards by
which the truth of any sect was usually judged (the sacraments,
faith vs. works, inner light, etc.), but rather the position one
takes on self-love. That ne seems to regard as the new frontier
separating true Christian believers both from the infidels
(atheists or deists) and from erring Christians. He publicizes
the errors of three positions on self-love maintained by writers
on religious philosophy in his time, berating all three for their
misuse of the concept of self-love. Adherents of the first group
(who apparently agree with or follow La Rochefoucauld) assert
“That a Man is not capable of the least Act of common
Honesty, or common Friendship, without a deliberate Prospect
of his own Interest as the prevailing Motive." Those in the
second group accept the principle of disinterestedness “but...de
ny the Infirmity and Corruption of Human Nature," which
amounts to denying the Fall of Man and Original Sin. Forbes
mentions no names, but Lord Shaftesbury and his followers
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belong here. Though the third group consists of professed
Christians, “they are so violent Advocates for Self-Love, or the
interested Principle, as to speak of the pure disinterested Love
of God in very unbecoming terms.” The members of this
group would seem to be Presbyterians and Calvinists of any
denomination;
perhaps Forbes’s countryman Archibald
Campbell fits here.16 Forbes then tells the reader that he is
concerned in this essay not to defend Christianity against the
atheists or deists, but to address professed Christians who
mistakenly accept self-love as the foundation of human nature.
To oppose their error he will, “in a rational way...shew the
best and the worst of Self-Love, and in what sense it is to be
understood, before it can be set up either as the Principle of
Vice or Virtue" (246-7).
His focus on amour-propre is most visible in the last major
section of his book containing his “Essay on Self-Love," but
the reader has been forewarned about the dominance of this
subject at the very outset, in a quotation from a prefatory
letter that Forbes addressed to his publisher:
I thought it was best to add the D. of Rochefoucault's
Description [of amour-propre or self-love; G. E. F. 563,
Truchet M.S. 1]] intirely, as being a Run of natural Elo
quence, without Precision, as the French call it; which
makes it rather the more agreeable. Sometimes he puts
Self-Love [i. e., amour-propre] for Covetousness, some
times for Pride, sometimes for Vanity, sometimes for Pas
sion, sometimes for Obstinacy, sometimes for mere
Whim, and sometimes for all these together, as appears
throughout his Reflections; but still he will be well
enough understood: for by Self-Love he either means
corrupt Nature in general, or some of its particular
Qualities, (v-vi)

Here Forbes underscores the difficulty that any translator faces
in trying to convey La Rochefoucauld’s particular uses of
amour-propre. Throughout his book he pursues his own dissec

16 See Archibald Campbell, An Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue (Edin
burgh: 1733). This work had previously been plagiarized and published by
Alexander Innes, with a modified title, in 1728.
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tion of this concept, arriving at a final pronouncement in the
last section of the appendix, called “Additions”:

With submission to the Duke of Rochefoucauld I’m
unwilling to call by the name of Self-Love all the Ir
regularities of Human Nature: neither the Violence of
our Passions, nor the Foolishness of our imaginations are
SelfLove... But neither wrong Reasoning nor right
Reasoning is Self-Love; nor can the Disorders of any
Faculty be imputed to the Faculty itself. Reason is sure
within its own Sphere, but is bewilder’d and lost when
it pretends to go farther And Self-Love is lawful within
due Allowances, but unlawful when it violates Order.
(375-6)
Forbes objects to the comprehensiveness of the duke’s key
phrase; he seems to object even more to its changeableness or
instability. But he never doubts the profound importance of
its central meaning, which stands for him as a supreme fact of
human nature. Of the deep-seatedness of amour-propre in each
human being he observes that “The Search into human Nature
can hardly be deep enough, so very latent is the Byass towards
ourselves" (319). On this issue he seems to agree completely
with La Rochefoucauld, but he is generally unwilling to accept
the denigration of human nature that he finds throughout the
Maximes. One senses his simultaneous attraction and repulsion;
he never condemns the duke’s maxims outright, and he
frequently seems to be emulating his style.
Forbes spends many pages pointing out the errors of those
who follow what Lord Shaftesbury called the “selfish system"
and others called Hobbism. He frequently reminds us that
although Rochefoucauld's image of self-love or amour-propre
brilliantly characterizes mankind in the fallen state, it should
by no means be taken as the full picture of human nature.
The antidote to the selfish system, he argues, is always man’s
capacity to cultivate the “pure, disinterested love of God,” as
in this typical passage:

The Advocates for Self-Interest have rais’d it so high, as
to make it the only Principle of acting, not only among
common Men, but the Apostles and Ambassadors from
Heaven. They have likewise perplex’d the Matter by
substituting Self Love for Self-lnterest, and so have render’d
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it an unfavourable thing to differ from them; since it is
so natural to love ourselves, and even to consult our
Interest. But they are to understand, that there is no
difference but in this single Point, “Whether God is to be
lov’d principally for his sake or our own.” (332)
If we look for any of these “Advocates for SelfInterest" apart
from La Rochefoucauld and Hobbes, the first name that comes
to mind might well be Bernard Mandeville, whose Fable of the
Bees exposes self-love or self-interest throughout the different
professions, genders and classes of society. Though Forbes
never names this older contemporary (the most notorious and
most outspoken advocate for the ethic of self-interest at that
time), it is difficult nor to suspect that Forbes was consciously
participating in the Mandeville Controversy, which in 1734,
one year after Mandeville’s death, was still quite active.
One conclusion that readers of La Rochefoucauld and
Mandeville sometimes arrived at is that by making self-love or
amour-propre the basis of virtually all human motivation, these
authors seem to deny the reality of virtue as an effective or
operative principle in human behavior. At least one contempo
rary philosopher has argued that Mandeville did not deny the
reality of virtue.17 Forbes in 1734 delivered essentially this
same judgment with respect to La Rochefoucauld, through a
fictional speaker in a philosophical dialogue: “Among the
Moderns the Duke of Rochefoucault is thought too rigid tn his
Sentiments upon Virtue; but he only reckons the thing a
greater rarity than the pretences to it” (133). This judgment is
consistent with Forbes's fundamental outlook on Christianity,
which assumes an ability (in at least some persons) to love God
disinterestedly, and further assumes that the conduct of such
persons can (at least sometimes) demonstrate the reality of
virtue.18

17 See John Colman, “Bernard Mandeville and the Reality of Virtue," Philosophy
47 (1972): 125-39.
18 For bes in another passage presents more "evidence" to show that La Rochefoucauld believed in the reality of virtue:
WHEN some Persons talk of the Deceitfulness of Virtue, they do not
mean that the Rule is fallacious or uncertain, but that Men act not from
the Motives they pretend to. The Duke of Rochefoucault says, "What the
World calls Virtue, is commonly but a Phantom form'd by our Passions."
[A]
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For Forbes, uncritical adherence to the doctrine of self-love
or amour-propre constitutes the great new heresy of modern
times, but he reminds us that St. Augustine's doctrine of the
two cities supplied an earlier formulation of essentially the
same concept. Though he quotes (263) Pascal's famous maxim
"Le moi est haissable" and other passages to describe the fallen
nature of man, his principal exhibit on this subject remains La
Rochefoucauld’s essay on amour-propre. Unlike many other
Christian readers of his time, he seems to place a high value on
this reflexion as a key to the positive and negative values of
self-love. Far from despising this piece, he makes it appear
useful to moralists and religious philosophers.19 There is also
the implication that he is reclaiming this text from those
proponents of self-love theory who have turned away from
Christianity.
O

O

O

O

Q

O

O

The more we come to see the uses that Forbes makes of the
Maximes, the more we may come to think that one of his aims
is to advance the prestige and reputation of its author. In
some cases, as we shall see, he tries to convert the duke's
maxims from their original intentions as descriptions of
worldliness and secular values, into statements of religious or
redemptive significance. But in one exceptional instance, he
devotes a two-part essay “A Discourse on Decency” (205-42),
to explicating (and thereby dignifying) a single brief maxim

THIS is far from denying there is such a thing as Virtue: on the con
trary, that same Author says, “Hypocrisy is an Homage which Vice
renders to Virtue." [B]
IF a Man denies there is any Virtue in the world, he is only suppos'd
to speak for himself and his own Club. (357-8)
[A] (G. E. F. 606, Truchet M.S. 34): Ce que le monde nomme verru n'est d'ordinaire qu'un fantome forme par nos passions, a qui on donne un nom honnete.
pour faire impunement ce qu'on veut.

[B] (G. E. F. and Truchet 218): L'hypocrisie est un hommage que le vice rend a
la vertu.
19 It is commonplace knowledge among La Rochefoucauld scholars that he had
de emphasized or excised a number of his earlier references to Christianity in
successive editions of his Maximes. Whether the value-system that dominates the
Maximes is essentially Epicurean or Augustinian is still for some a matter of
contention.
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regarding human or this-worldly conduct. The broader subject
of this essay is not simply the word “decency," but more
precisely La Rochefoucauld's maxim on decency (G. E. F. and
Truchet 447). Without immediately identifying La Rochefou
cauld as the author of this maxim, Forbes uses an English
translation of it as the epigraph to the first of the two related
"discourses” comprising this essay. The maxim is marvelously
concise, abstract and pregnant: "Decency is the least of all
Laws, and the most observed.” In the original, "La bienseance
est la moindre de toutes les lois, et la plus suivie.” On this
slender foundation Forbes builds a striking discussion of that
segment of social behavior which, with respect to the higher
religious and moral obligations, is almost neutral and consists
of “things indifferent,” and of manners rather than morals. In
some ways what Forbes manages to extract from this maxim
seems considerably more inventive than his identifying La
Rochefoucauld’s amour-propre as a "bottomless Pit of Self
Love” (50), the greatest obstacle to the pure disinterested love
of God. The diminutive maxim on decency—La Rochefou
cauld’s only pronouncement on that subject in his Max
imes—becomes Lord Forbes’s gateway to the much-discussed
subject of “the honest man” or “1’honnete homme.”20
Forbes first subdivides decency into two classes, real decency
(founded “in the natural Congruity of Things” [207]) and
imaginary decency, which is more arbitrary because it is
founded on custom. This imaginary or customary decency, he
argues, is the true subject of La Rochefoucauld’s maxim on
decency. It is by comparison the less worthy form of decency,
but “in things that are harmless (208)” it is preferable to follow
“customary Decency” rather than to dress or behave or speak
in a singular manner. For him real decency, which is in
separable from virtue, is a fundamental value even though it is
less significant than practicing virtue (Christian charity) and
shunning vice. Nevertheless, “trespasses against Decency of all
kinds are to be avoided: Singularity is very offensive, as being
a tacit Reprimand of the Behaviour of others" (221). At the
20 Modern scholarship on the "honnete hooune" begins with Maurice Magendie's

La Politesse mondaine et les theories de l'honnetete en France au 17 siecle de 1600 a
1660 (Paris: 1925). For further discussion and bibliography, see Jean-Pierre Dens,
L'Honnete homme et la critique de gout: esthetique et societe an XVIF siecle
(Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1981), and Oskar Roth, Die
Gesellschaft der Honnetes Gens: Zur sozialethischen Grundlegung des honnetete-Ideals
bei La Rochefoucauld (Heidelberg: 1981).
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heart of Forbes’s explanation of decency is the notion of a
group or social standards: what is decent—i. e., fitting, proper
or decorous—is never exclusively determined by individual
whim or inclination.
Pursuing the two subdivisions or kinds of decency, Forbes
relies on popular theorizing about motives, or theory of the
passions. What drives the worldly-minded is not a pure love
of God but their desire for the approval of others and conse
quently their fear of shame—worldly and selfish motives. The
true decency that he lauds rises above these mundane motives.
Forbes admits that there is something good and socially
desirable in this lower form of (customary) decency; in fact,
it is indispensable for the daily operations of civil society. But
he must capture the higher ground, he must emphasize his
spiritual allegiance, and he does so by reminding u$ of the
emptiness of customary decency: by following worldly or
customary decency only, “we are at more pains to please the
World, than either to please ourselves or the ALMIGHTY"
(209). Again Forbes is of two minds regarding a maxim by La
Rochefoucauld; he cannot praise the duke's words on decency
without pointing out their deficiency of spiritual value. Yet
when he faults La Rochefoucauld, he refuses to regard his
maxims as being completely false, misleading or corruptive.
One senses, moreover, that he admires the maxims. Why
else would he recall them and imitate them throughout his
book? He shows his admiration in two main directions: first,
outright imitation of the duke's laconic style, and second,
selective conversion or transformation of the duke's maxims to
serve ends not originally intended. For examples of the first
we have these sentences on decency with which Forbes
concludes his essay (claiming that they are not really offered as
authoritative maxims!):

[2] MAN naturally loves Virtue and Decency: and when
he is deceived, it is under an appearance of something
that’s good.
[5] DECENCY in Opinions is more properly Truth: in
Inclinations and Actions ’tis Virtue and Goodness. But
the common Province of Decency goes no farther than
the Circumstances of Actions, or the Manner of doing
them.
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[7] THE Indecencies of Conversation arise from Vanity,
Ill-humour, and a bastard kind of Good-humour. This
false Complaisance appears much in the Custom of
Detraction: it goes on against the Absent, because 'tis
suppos’d to be agreeable to the Present, who become the
Absent the next moment, and suffer in their turn.
[8] PROFESS'D Indecency of any kind is Insolence.
Vanity is commonly the first Inducement to foolish
talking. Thus smutty Jests oftener shew the Ostentation
of Wit than the Inclination to Lewdness; and impious
Expressions are no sure Argument of Unbelief.
[11] INDECENCIES in Apparel are as much shunn’d as
any. Herein Custom triumphs eminently: 'tis the chief
Point of Uniformity among all Ranks and Parties.
[12] IN all other Articles of Expence, that which is
nearest the middle must be Decency; the precise Point
not being discoverable: the Extremes of High and Low
are either call'd Extravagant or Sordid.

[131 WE see of what use this inexplicable thing, Decency,
is for regulating all our different Motions: it keeps our
Pride itself in some order, tho' it be call'd its Daughter;
and if it does not restrain our Inclinations and Aversions,
it often hinders them from breaking out. It lulls our
Spirits asleep, and by turns rouses them. In short,
Decency may be now reckon'd of such service in the
Commonwealth, that without it the Judicatures both in
Church and State wou'd have much more to do than
they have; to say nothing of the Tranquillity it helps to
preserve in private Families. (240-42)
From one maxim treated as seedling, he grows a whole tree,
but none of his attempts makes us think that he has come
close to rivalling the artistry of the duke.
When he is not striving to imitate them, he can be seen
trying to transform them to suit his purposes. In the follow
ing example Forbes borrows from La Rochefoucauld but uses
the borrowed words and imagery to oppose the author’s
original intention:

